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Defective Automobiles and the U.C.C.
William T. Stanley, Jr.*

T

HE AUTOMOBILE WARRANTY DISCLAIMER

today is the subject of much

controversy and abuse, often with good reason. The automobile purchaser has long suffered from being on the sticky end of a contract of
adhesion. Those who own automobiles have all too often had unpleasant
experiences with patent flaws, latent defects and shoddy repairs. But
sympathy is generally coming to lie with the "aggrieved" buyer, and the
warranty disclaimer is now under siege.1 As these express disclaimers
are increasingly invalidated by the courts, a familiarity with the implied
warranties of merchantability 2 and fitness for purpose, 3 and a working
knowledge of remedies (for buyer and seller) become imperative.
Two interrelated topics will be covered in this discussion: warranty
disclaimers under Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors4 and under the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter referred to as "Code"); and rejection, revocation, and cure under the Code. Zabriskie Chevrolet v.
Smith5 will also be examined, for this particular case contains one of the
few opinions which actually attempts6 to fully apply the Code and its
remedies to a warranty disclaimer situation.
* B.A., Washington and Lee Univ.; General Manager of Burring Production Co.,
Cleveland, Ohio; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State Univ.
1 In a news release of March 19, 1969 the Federal. Trade Commission made public
its Proposed Guides for Advertising Over-The-Counter Drugs (i.e., non-prescription
drugs). Buried deep in the proposed Act is the following:
Guide 12(e). An express "guarantee" or "warranty" should not contain limitations, disclaimers or provisos which purport to deprive members
of the public of any rights which they would have in the absence
of such express provisions.
This may be the beginning of a significant trend. At least it signals the direction
that the F.T.C. may be planning to take, and this in itself is important.
Also see Federal Trade Commission Staff Report on Automobile Warranties (undated report presumably published between 1966 and 1969, available through United
States Congressman), which was conducted and prepared by the Bureau of Deceptive Practices and Bureau of Economics. In this report are actual case histories of
warranty problems, statistics concerning all phases of vehicle reliability and warranty
application, advertising, practices, etc.
2 U.C.C. Sec. 2-314: (1) Unless excluded or modified (Sec. 2-316), a warranty that
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as . . . are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.
3 U.C.C. Sec. 2-315: Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know
any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is
unless excluded or modified . . . an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.
4 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (Supr. Ct. 1960).
5 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
6 Here, although the operation of applying the Code was successful, the patient
died. This author feels that a wrong decision was reached.
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In the Zabriskie case, the defendant, Smith, signed a form purchase
order for a new Chevrolet automobile which was to be sold to him by
Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. This automobile was "represented to the defendant to be a brand-new car that would operate perfectly." 7 Eight
days later, the defendant's wife took delivery of the automobile and was
at that time presented with the manufacturer-dealer warranty, which
contained a disclaimer clause of which neither she nor the defendant was
aware.
The car was driven .7 miles when a small valve in the transmission
failed, making the car virtually inoperable. The plaintiff had the car
towed to its (the plaintiff's) repair shop and cured the defect by replacing the entire transmission.'
The defendant refused to take delivery of the repaired car and
asserted a cancellation of the sale.9 Plaintiff then brought suit for the
purchase price, and the defendant ultimately prevailed in the ensuing
litigation.
Warranty Disclaimers
In Zabriskie, the warranty disclaimer was in fine print, number nine
of eleven clauses, on the back of the sales contract signed by the buyer:
There are no warranties, express or implied, on Chevrolet motor
vehicles sold by Dealer except the New Vehicle Warranty which
Dealer, as seller, and not as agent of the manufacturer, gives to Purchaser on each new Chevrolet motor vehicle sold by the Dealer.
The court disqualified this disclaimer under Code Section 2-316(2),
which reads:
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantabilityand in case of writing must be conspicuous, and
to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion
must be by a writing and conspicuous .

.

. language . . . is sufficient

if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend
beyond the description on the face hereof." (Emphasis added.) 10
7 Zabriskie Chevrolet v. Smith, supra note 5, 240 A.2d, at 197, 200.

8 The new transmission inserted into the automobile was removed from another
brand-new similar vehicle in the plaintiff's showroom. The transmission was factory
new and had never been used. This was a fact uncontroverted by the defendant.
The precise reason for substitution of a whole new unit rather than replacement
was never made clear. However, quaere: would not this factory built, new transmission be even a better form of cure than a dealer rebuilt unit (the original with
a new valve)?
9 The buyer also stopped payment on the purchase money check.
10 For the text of the referenced U.C.C. Sec. 2-316(3) (b), see supra note 38.
The referenced U.C.C. Sec. 2-316(3) (c) states, "An implied warranty can also
be excluded or modified by course of dealing or course of performance or usage
of
trade."
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Certainly the fine print on the back of the sales order could not be construed as "conspicuous," 11 and many cases support this view of the
court. 1 2 The language of the disclaimer was not challenged by the court,

although other jurisdictions have held that a valid disclaimer of the implied warranties of fitness or merchantability must plainly state that
there is no warranty that the product is reasonably suited for use as an
automobile.

13

The facts of the Zabriskie case show that the defendant did not receive the "New Car Warranty" booklet, which contained the specific
disclaimers, until eight days after signing the sales order form. Presuming that the disclaimer on the sales order form failed, any reference
contained in it alluding to the "New Car Warranty" would also fail. The
"New Car Warranty" and its disclaimers must be invalid under basic
contract principles since additional consideration is lacking to support
14
such a subsequently received warranty.
These disclaimers were disqualified for technical reasons, and many
courts have employed this refuge to escape having to determine unconscionableness. The Zabriskie court went still further to discuss the lack
of enforceability of the disclaimers before it, even if all the requirements
of Code Section 2-316 (2) had been met. 15 The buyer was held to be left
11 U.C.C. Sec. 1-201(10) defines "conspicuous" as being "so written that a reasonable
person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed heading in
capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous, (or) . . . if
it is in larger or other contrasting type or color."
12 See Dailey v. Holiday Distributing Corp., 151 N.W. 2d 477 (Iowa Supr. Ct., 1967),
where a fine print limitation on warranty found upon the reverse side of a contract
was branded by the court as "evasive concealment." See also Minikes v. Admiral
Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 1012, 266 N.Y.S. 2d 461 (Supr. Ct. 1966), in which a disclaimer,
although on the front of an order, was smaller in type size than the rest of the
order printing and was construed to be not conspicuous. See also S.F.C. Acceptance
Corp. v. Ferree, 39 Pa. D. & C. 2d 225; 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 808 (Ct. of Common
Pleas, 1966), and Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F. 2d 585 (8 Cir. 1964),
where the disclaimer was on the front of the contract in the same size type and
color of printing as the main body, but was held to not be conspicuous. The U.C.C.
was applicable here as provided by contract.
'3 See Willman v. American Motor Sales Co., 44 Erie Co. C.U. 51, 1 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 100 (Ct. of Common Pleas 1961). See also Boshkoff, Some Thoughts About
Physical Harm, Disclaimers and Warranties, 4 B.C. Ind. & Comm. L.R. 285 (1963),
which applies the same philosophy to Henningsen (pre-Code): "The disclaimer in
Henningsen should be considered invalid, not because it was imposed upon a small
buyer by a big seller, but because it did not tell the consumer that he might expect
his car to fail within a month of purchase."
14 In Zabriskie, supra note 5, the Court cites Diepeveen v. Larry Vogt, Inc., 27 N.J.
Super. 254, 99 A.2d 329 (App. Div. 1953), in which title to flower bulbs was found
to have passed to the buyer previous to the effectiveness of the disclaimer, due to
a "standing order." Mack Trucks of Arkansas, Inc. v. Jet Asphalt & Rock Co., 246
Ark. Sco. 99; 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 93 (1969), and Marion Power Shovel Co. v. Huntsman, 246 Ark. Sco. 149, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 100 (1969) are two cases decided under
the Uniform Commercial Code which hold that delivery of a disclaimer after a
contract is made negates the disclaimer.
15 U.C.C. Sec. 2-316(2) states that "Language to exclude all implied warranties of
fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that 'There are no warranties which
(Continued on next page)
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in the possible position of having "to accept the vehicle, even if it did
not operate," and the court reasoned that "this was obviously not the
buyer's intention." 16 Reliance was placed upon Code Section 2-719
which provides for contractual modification or limitation of remedy:
(1) (a). The agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or
in substitution for those provided in this article and may limit or
alter the measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by
limiting the buyer's remedies to . . .repair and replacement of non-

conforming goods or parts.
(1) (b). The contractual remedy may be expressly agreed to be exclusive and then it will be the sole remedy.
Such is the case under our hypothetically code-perfect disclaimer. But
Code Section 2-719 (1), (a) and (b) are subject to Code Section 2-719
(2):
Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail
of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.
The Official Comment to 2-719 calls for "at least adequate remedies" to
be available, "thus any clause purporting to modify or limit the remedial
provisions of this Article in an unconscionable manner is subject to deletion and in that event the remedies made available by this Article are
applicable as if the stricken clause had never existed." (Emphasis
added.) Cross reference is made in the Official Comments to Code Section 2-302 which gives the court almost plenary power to modify an unconscionable (as defined by the court) contract. 1 7 The Official Comment
to Code Section 2-302 says that "the principle is one of the prevention
of oppression and unfair surprise . .. and not of disturbance of allocation

of risks because of superior bargaining power" (emphasis added)

.1

A

(Continued from preceding page)
extend beyond the description on the face hereof.'" Contrast this with Willman v.
American Motor Sales Co., supra note 13. But, theoretically, the requirements of
2-316 could be met even if brightly colored ink, large type, and Willman court
language were necessary.
16 Zabriskie Chevrolet v. Smith, supra note 5 at 290 A.2d 197. But, quaere: in this
situation wasn't the buyer given contractual protection as to repairs and replacement parts in the warranty? Would it be unconscionable for the buyer to have to
accept an inoperative vehicle if the seller had to cure perfectly within a reasonable
time? And is it practically possible or even feasible for any mass -manufacturer to
produce complicated mechanical goods with "factory new parts which (will) operate
perfectly as represented"? It would seem from the tenor of the language in the
Zabriskie decision that no substitution of parts by the dealer will be allowed.
17 An excellent short explanation of the application of Uniform Commercial Code
Section 2-302 is found in note, Bargaining Power and Unconscionability: A suggested approach to U.C.C. Section 2-302, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 998 (1966). For a more
detailed account of history and application, see note, Unconscionable Contracts:
The Uniform Commercial Code, 45 Iowa L. Rev. 843 (1960).
18 Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F. 2d 80 (3 Cir. 1948), cited by the Official Comment to Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-302, involved an agreement for the
purchase of carrots. The court refused to enforce the contract against the defendant grower, possibly because he was oppressed in a rising market, but ostensibly

(Continued on next page)
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number of cases are cited by the authors of the Official Comment to Code
Section 2-302 to supplement their explanation of Code Section 2-302.19
The leading cases decided on the basis of unconscionability all have
one major common characteristic. Someone has suffered an unconscionable loss with no adequate remedy at law, and the court makes the loser
whole through various equitable remedies.
But is the warranty disclaimer in the Zabriskie case unconscionable
as to the buyer's remedies in this particular situation? The court refers
to Henningsen, certainly a leading case of historic proportions, although
pre-Code. In Henningsen, a buyer of a new car drove it 400 miles when
it unaccountably went out of control and was totally wrecked. Due to
the pulverized condition of the machine, the buyer was unable to make
a case of negligence, prima facie. So, he sued the automobile dealer on
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, despite the standard
disclaimer limiting the buyer's remedy to replacement or repair of defective parts. If the court had not equitably struck down the disclaimer,
the buyer would have been left with only a new replacement part for the
faulty item precipitating the wreck and a pile of useless junk, the remains of his shiny new automobile. The disclaimer as applied to those
circumstances was inequitable and against public policy. The wrath of
the Henningsen court rightly descended upon the disclaimer as "so
inimical to the public good as to compel an adjudication of its invalid0

ity." 2

21
The Henningsen decision was partially based upon Myers v. Land,
which the Zabriskie court also quoted. Myers v. Land was decided

(Continued from preceding page)
because of several fine print clauses which were not at issue. 2-302 offers a choice,
however, of allowing the court to delete only those clauses which it deems unconscionable and enforcing the balance of the contract. See note, Unconscionable Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 401 at 413 for an
expanded discussion of this case and its implications.
In spite of this hopeful admonition by the Comment, the modern trend may be
toward equitable justice in spite of contractual agreement. A leading case in this
area is Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F. 2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965), where the court found that if the element of unconscionability is present
at the time a contract is made, the contract should not be enforced. Terms such
as "absence of a meaningful choice," "little bargaining power," "commercially unreasonable contract" are employed and give an insight into the direction of that
court.
19 Among these cases are the following: Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v.
Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 414, 73 P. 2d 1272 Sup. Ct. 1937), where the plaintiff suffered loss when defendant furnished moldy catsup; Hardy v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327 (1928), where the plaintiff's automobile had certain latent defects such as rendered it reasonably unsuited to the
use intended; Andrews Bros. v. Singer & Co., 1 K.B. 17 (1934), where the plaintiff
was "stuck" with a used car instead of the new model he ordered; Meyer v. Packard
Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (Sup. Ct. 1922), where the buyer
was left with a truck which wasn't rebuilt to the standards expected, and wouldn't
do the work intended for it.
20 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, supra note 4, 161 A. 2d, at 95.
21 314 Ky. 514, 235 S.W. 2d 988 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
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equitably indicating that for every wrong there must be a right. The
decision was justifiable in that a machine failed to fulfill its intended
purpose of manufacturing concrete blocks. The theory espoused was
more than a breach of warranty. Rather, there was no delivery of that
which was bought.
But how is this applicable to Zabriskie? Modern leading cases 22 decided against the validity of warranty disclaimers have been based upon
real need, where the buyer has not, for one reason or another, been made
whole as to the terms of the contract and the seller has sought refuge in
a disclaimer. Out of these decisions two vaguely distinctive areas of case
law have evolved.
The first group consists of those situations in which there is a complete and usually unexpected failure of the machine to accomplish the
purpose for which it was intended. Personal injury is often claimed. The
failure invariably results in acute and obvious loss to the purchaser (a
typical example being Henningsen); and it can be a fault in original design such that the machine never works (Myers v. Land), or appear later
as in Henningsen. But loss is always obvious.

23

The second group is built on claims of improper, insufficient or intermittent operation of the machine. These failures are a matter of degree
and are characterized as chronic lingering problems which often are not
solved by continuous repairs.24 Here, again, the buyer has suffered loss,
and is less than whole, although the amount of loss is usually less easy
to prove than in the first group.
Zabriskie fits neither of these categories, for the defendant has been
made whole. The plaintiff repaired the defect, and the fact that the automobile was as good as new after these repairs was uncontroverted by the
See Greeno v. Clark Equipment Company, 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965), in
which a defective forklift seriously injured the plaintiff; Seely v. White Motor Company, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P. 2d 145 (Sup. Ct. 1965), where a truck bucked and
"galloped," the defendant repeatedly attempted without success to correct
the defect
and the truck ultimately crashed; Green v. Northeast Motor Company, 166 A. 2d
923 (Muni. Ct. App. D.C. 1961), and Rozen v. Chrysler Corp., 142 So. 2d 735 Fla. App.
(1962) where the seller never was able to correct defects in the automobile after
repeated attempts.
23 See Greeno v. Clark Equipment Company, supra note 22; Seely v. White Motor
Company, supra note 22; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
377 P. 2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1962), where a Shopsmith lathe failed and caused injury to
the plaintiff; Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969),
where the plaintiff was injured in an automobile crash resulting from defects in
throttle linkage and related parts.
24 See Green v. Northeast Motor Company, supra note 22; Rozen v. Chrysler Corp.,
supra note 22; Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Industries, Inc., 68 ll. App.
2d 297, 216 N.E. 2d 282 (1965), where an air conditioning unit never worked correctly, leaking water, etc.; Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 51
(Ky. Sup. Ct. 1969), and Sutler v. St. Clair Motors, Inc., 44 Ill. App. 2d 318, 194 N.E.
2d 674, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 125 (1963), where many attempted repairs of a tractor
and of an Edsel automobile respectively were unsuccessful, and recovery was
allowed,
22

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol18/iss3/14

6

DEFECTIVE AUTOS AND THE U.C.C.

defendant. 25 How had the defendant been injured? He had suffered no
loss, had not changed his position to his detriment, and had been made
whole as to the basis of the bargain. The "demands of social justice" ,6
have certainly been met. Code Section 2-719 calls for "at least minimum
adequate remedies," and certainly in this case the buyer had virtually
a complete remedy. The cases contained in the Official Comment to Code
Section 2-302, as mentioned above, all remedied wrongs in which the
buyer suffered a loss and had no recourse under the contract to recover.
Such is not the case in Zabriskie, in which the court's substitution of a
new transmission by the dealer is labeled an "inadequate remedy," unconscionable, and against public policy, allowing Code Section 2-302 by
dicta to bar the disclaimer's remedy.
Rejection, Revocation, and Cure Under the Code
This area of the Code is one of the least understood and most often
abused or avoided;27 yet the concept is not difficult. After an elusive
point in time, acceptance takes place and rejection becomes revocation
of acceptance. The importance of this fact is more than semantical, for
the Code distinguishes the right of revocation of acceptance from that of
rejection. The seller's right to cure may also be affected.
The New Jersey Official Comments to Code Section 2-606 correctly
allude to the similarity between Code Section 2-606 and Sections 47 and
48 of the Sales Act.28 This similarity is important because it allows the
injection of pre-code case law as still valid law.29 Code Section 2-606(1)
relates to acceptance:
(a). Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer after a reasonable
the goods signifies to the seller that the goods
opportunity to inspect
30
are conforming.
25 Words of the plaintiff's Post-Trial Memorandum.
26 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, supra note 4, 161 A. 2d, at 83.
27 An exception to this statement is Bartus v. Riccardi, 284 N.Y. Supp. 2d 222,
4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 845 (1967), in which a hearing aid was rejected by the buyer,
but the seller was allowed to cure. The code is knowledgeably applied by this court,
which also makes reference to excellent notes covering this subject, in 48 Cornell
L. Quarterly 13; 29 Albany Law Review 260 (1968).
28 It is interesting to note that the Official Comments to the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Uniform Commercial Code cross reference table to the Uniform Sales
Act only cross refers 2-606 to U.S.A. 48 and not U.S.A. 47. U.C.C. Sec. 2-513 is,
however, referenced to U.S.A. 47.
29 One major difference in the angle of approach is the pre-code concept of the
passing of title in dealing with sales problems. Under the Uniform Sales Act a
buyer's return of goods to a seller following passage of title to buyer would be a
rescission of the contract, not a rejection of the goods. See Alchian v. McDonald,
40 Cal. App. 505, 181 P. 77 (1919).
30 U.C.C. 1-204(1) defines reasonable time for taking any action as depending "on
the nature, purpose, and circumstances of such action."
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(b). Acceptance occurs when the buyer fails to make an effective
rejection under 2-602 (1), but such acceptance does not occur until
the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect.3
Code Section 2-513 (1) adds weight to the buyers right to inspect before
accepting even if he has previously inspected the goods:
Unless otherwise agreed .

.

. where goods are tendered or delivered

or identified to the contract for sale, the buyer has a right before
payment or acceptance to inspect them at any reasonable place and
time and in any reasonable manner.
Clearly under the Code a buyer is not deemed to have accepted the
goods tendered by the seller until he has had a "reasonable time" to
inspect, even though the goods are in his possession, and even though
he had a previous opportunity to inspect. This concept is given strength
because the framers of the Code deleted the emphasized portion of the
Uniform Sales Act, Section 47:
47(1). Where goods are delivered to the buyer, which he has not
previously examined, he is not deemed to have accepted them unless
and until he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining them
for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with
the contract. (Emphasis added.)
It is implied in this language that a buyer who has examined goods
before delivery and later accepts them waives his right to rescind.3 2 He
has accepted. The Code does not contain this language or its implication
(see Code Section 2-606, 2-602, 2-513). This obviously intentional deletion certainly indicates that the intent of the Code's Editorial Board was
to ease restrictions on inspection.
Assuming, then, that the buyer has the right under the Code to possess and to inspect the goods prior to acceptance, the next question must
be one of reasonable time for inspection by the buyer, and his seasonable
notification of the defect to the seller. In this area, case law decided
under Uniform Sales Act Sections 47 and 48 would apply (barring the
disparity as to previous examination), for as compared above, these provisions are wholly adopted with little change by the Code as to time for
notice, etc. These sections of the Uniform Sales Act were generally interpreted as allowing the buyer a reasonable time within which to examine
the goods and even to allow the buyer to test the goods for a short time
to determine whether or not they conformed to the contract. 33 Many
31
32

Ibid.

Rescission is a creature of the Uniform Sales Act. It had various often vague
meanings. Here the meaning is probably best classed as "revocation of acceptance."
The goods are restored to the seller but the contract remains intact. For an expanded

explanation and case reference on this subject, see note, 11 UCLA L. Rev. 78,
at 91 (1963).
33 Williston on Sales § 475 (rev. ed. 1948).
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535

34
The New Jersey Study Commission
cases support this assumption.
which authored the New Jersey Official Comments to the Code referred
35
In
to several cases which the Zabriskie court picked up as significant.
36
recertain
held
buyer
the
S. G. Young, Inc. v. B & C DistributorsCo.,
to have
sistors longer than a reasonable time (five months), and was held

waived his right to reject.
buyer's right to inspection of
Code cases abound which support the
3 7
acceptance.
goods after possession, before
In Zabriskie the buyer contended that a "spin around the block"
In
and .7 miles of driving was not a reasonable opportunity to inspect.
even
light of cases noted above, in which latent defects were discovered
months after delivery, the Zabriskie court was certainly in the mainopporstream in ruling that the buyer had not exceeded his "reasonable
tunity to inspect." Also it was noted that the buyer could not have reapersonably discovered the latent defect until it noticeably affected the
38
The buyer had the right to inspect the goods
formance of the machine.
before acceptance, and in the Zabriskie case he had not yet accepted.
But let us return to the question of what the requisites are which
would enable a buyer to rightfully return a defective automobile.
34 See Anderson Hosiery Co. v. Dixie Knitting Mills, Inc., 204 F. 2d 503 (4 Cir. 1953),
where a latent defect was not discovered by reasonable inspection before delivery,
which was commenced as to the defective goods "a few months after March." Defects were not discovered until the end of June. Promptness of notification was
deemed a question for a jury, but reasonable opportunity was given the buyer to
inspect and discover defect. Also see Square Deal Mach. Co. v. Garrett Corp., 275
P. 2d 46; Storz Brewing Co. v. Brown, 47 N.W. 2d 407, 154 Neb. 204 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
An outstanding discussion is found in Reliance Varnish Co. v. Mullins Lumber Co.,
213 S.C. 84, 48 S.E. 2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
Also, the burden of proof of the unreasonableness of time of notice has been
held to be on the seller. Webster v. Klassen, 109 Cal. App. 2d 583, 241 P. 2d 302
(1952).
35 See Paul Gerli and Company v. Mistletoe Silk Mills, 80 N.J.L. 128, 76 A. 335
(1910), which offers a restatement of Uniform Sales Act Section 47; Woodward v.
Emmons, 61 N.J.L. 281, 39 A. 703 (1898), where a buyer of stonecrushers discovered
a defect, but continued to use the machines, thus waiving his right to the defense
of total lack of consideration.
36 23 N.J. Super. 15, 92 A. 2d 519 (1952). New Jersey adopted the Uniform Commercial Code effective January 1, 1963.
37 Typical are: Myers v. Antone, 227 A. 2d 56 (D.C. App. 1967), where purchaser
executed a contract of sale in March and was allowed recovery upon discovering a
faulty heating system in November; Magnavox Company v. Royson, 195 Pa. Super.
139, 169 A. 2d 559 (1961), where a buyer held defective goods for possibly as long
as 22 months before returning.
38 Citing, Massari v. Accurate Bushing Co., 8 N.J. 299, 85 A. 2d 260 (Sup. Ct. 1951),
in which packaged bushings were not discovered to be defective for possibly as long
as two years. The reasonableness of this length of time was held to be a question
for the jury. This overruled any possibility of the Zabriskie defendant having
waived his rights to claim an implied warranty:
U.C.C. 2-316(3) (b): When the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused
to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which
an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him.
See the Official Comment to U.C.C. 2-316, number 8, for further explanation.
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First, let us assume the buyer had accepted the goods. Under Code
Section 2-607 (3) (a):
Where tender has been accepted the buyer must within a reasonable
time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify
the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy. 39
Reasonable time in virtually all cases of this nature has been in terms
of weeks or months. 40 But in Zabriskie, possession, discovery, and notice
were almost concurrent. Certainly notice was within a reasonable enough
period to allow revocation. Under Code Section 2-608 (2) it is again
stated that the revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable
time after acceptance, but more importantly under Code Section
2-608 (1):
The buyer may revoke his acceptance at a lot or commercial unit
whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value if he has accepted it (a) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced ...

by the difficulty of discovery before

acceptance (emphasis added).
This theory grew directly out of the Uniform Sales Act, in which
Section 69(1) (d) allowed the buyer to "rescind" the contract in the
case of breach of warranty, 41 and refuse the goods or return them for
price paid if already accepted. If the seller committed a material breach
of the contract, "rescission" was generally allowed in accordance with
the universal principle of contract law that the obligation on each side
is impliedly conditioned on receiving the agreed counter performance.42
Williston said that the desirability of such a remedy depends purely
on
the business customs of a community and on whether it appeals to the
natural sense of justice. The remedy of rescission, if allowed at all, was
to be allowed on broad principles of justice. 43 The decisions allowing
rescission did not generally make the right dependent upon the importance of the warranty or the extent of the breach of it. 4 4 Honnold 45

traces a slow retreat from "an inflexible rule of rejection."

46

Under U.C.C. 2-607(4) the burden of proof is on the buyer to establish
any
breach with respect to the goods accepted.
39

Typically: Mahurin v. Schneck, 390 P. 2d 576 (Ariz. Sup. Ct.
1964). Buyer
bought business as of Feb. 1, learned of deficiencies and notified
on Feb. 11. The seller did not remedy. Buyer then wrote a letter seller to remedy
of rescission Feb.
18. This was held seasonable notice. Boe v. Thorburn Herseth, Inc.,
134 N.W. 2d 33
(N.D. Sup. Ct. 1965), held that 10 days after the purchase of a tractor
time for rescission. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 was adequate
F. 2d 292 (3rd
Cir. 1961), held that a ten month delay following the removal of
the buyer's cancerous lung was not a bar to notice.
41 Under the Uniform Sales Act Section 69(1) (d),
where there is a breach of warranty by the seller, the buyer may at his election "rescind the contract."
42 Vold, Handbook of the Law of Sales, 494 (1931).
43 Williston, supra note 33 at § 608.
44 Ibid.
45 Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U. Pa. L. R. 457
(1948-9).
46 Id. at 97, U. Pa. L. Rev. 460.
40
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In the area of revocation of acceptance Code decisions bear out the
Uniform Sales Act demand for substantial or material impairment of
value to the purchaser.
47
However, much to Honnold's distress, the right of rejection under
the Code takes another tack. The Code time limit for rejection is described as "reasonable" in Code Section 2-602 (1) (a):
Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their deIt is ineffective unless the buyer reasonably notifies
livery or tender.
48
the seller.

But the right of rejection under the Code is based upon the theory of
"perfect tender," or delivery conforming to the contract in every respect
under Code Section 2-601:
Unless otherwise agreed under the sections on contractual limitations of remedy (sections 2-718 and 2-719), if the goods or the tender
of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer
may (a) reject the whole.
Immediately, the definition of "conformity" becomes basic. Under
Code Section 2-106 (2):
Goods .

.

. are "conforming" or conform to the contract when they

are in accordance with the obligations under the contract.
The Official Comment to Code Section 2-106 says that Code Section
2-106 (2) is intended to continue the policy of requiring exact performance by seller of his obligations as a condition to his right to require
acceptance.
So to allow revocation of acceptance, the Code demands a defect
significant enough to substantially impair the value of the goods to the
buyer. Yet, rejection is permitted upon any imperfection of tender.
There can be no question that the Zabriskie automobile did not conform
to the contract, or that the defect, however small, caused a substantial
impairment of value to the buyer. The remedies of rejection or revocation of acceptance are both open to this particular buyer.
Revocation of acceptance and rejection both indicate the right of the
buyer to return the goods to the seller, a simple concept. But is the
contractual relationship terminated, or does the seller have a right to
cure the defect and retender the goods? Generally, courts lve avoided
the issue by retaining the Uniform Sales Act concept (as it later became
interpreted) 49 of granting "rescission" for substantial breach of warranty, and ignoring the Code.
Honnold, supra note 44.
U.C.C. Sec. 1-204(2) indicates that an action is taken "seasonably" when it is
taken "at or within a reasonable time."
49 Noted as "the slow retreat," Honnold, supra note 44.
47
48
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The "Buyer's Remedies in General" is the caption of Code Section
2-711:
Where .

.

. the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes accept-

ance then with respect to any goods involved . . . the buyer may
cancel and ... (recover) so much of the price as has been paid.
On its face this couldn't be a more obvious statement. But a disastrous
blow would be dealt to free commerce if every buyer could reject for
the smallest flaw5" and cancel his contractual obligation under Code Section 2-711, so the Official Comment to Code Section 2-711 qualifies the
application:
Despite the seller's breach, proper retender of delivery under the
section on cure of improper tender or replacement can effectively
preclude the buyer's remedies under this section, except for the delay involved. 51
Also, the Official Comment to Code Section 2-106, which demands that
goods be conforming to the contract, supports this qualification:
However, the seller is in part safeguarded against surprise as a result of sudden technicality on the buyer's part by the provisions of
Section 2-508 .

.

. moreover usage of trade frequently permits com-

mercial leeways in performance.

This would indicate that the framers of the Code desired perfect
tender, but also an equitable balance on the sellers side through Code
Section 2-508 and trade customs:
(1). Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because
non-conforming and the time for performance has not yet expired,
the seller may seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure
and may then within the contract time make a conforming delivery.
(2). Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the
seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with
or without money allowance the seller may if he seasonably notifies
the buyer have a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming
tender (emphasis added).
In Zabriskie, Code Section 2-508(1) is satisfied as to seasonability of
notice of intent to cure, which was simultaneous with the buyer's rejection. The retender of goods was made "within a day or so of the complaint," 52 and should be considered within the contractual time for delivery. If it is considered to be past the contractual dead-line, Code Section 2-508 (2) would apply. Then the question of "reasonable grounds"
arises. Did the seller reasonably believe that the automobile would be
acceptable?
50 Commonly referred to as the "perfect tender rule."
See U.C.C. Sec. 2-508.
52 Zabriskie Chevrolet v. Smith, supra note 5, Plaintiff's Post-Trial Memorandum.
51
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539

Plaintiff Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. is a dealer. According to the
sevenfacts, the plaintiff completed a dealer's routine checklist including
including
ty items of preparation and inspection of the new automobile,
which53
a road test, which the vehicle passed. No evidence of the defect
defendant
the
by
noticed
or
appeared later was found by the plaintiff
until the defendant drove .7 miles at which time the faulty valve failed
to operate.
Externally, before it hindered the operation of the vehicle, the latent
defect was not detectable. Referring to the helplessness of the buyer,
suffithe court said "to have the automobile inspected by someone with
delatent
discover
to
order
in
vehicle
the
disassemble
cient expertise to
highly
and
impossible
assuredly
is
signed,
is
fects before the contract
impractical." Reversing the thrust of the court, must the dealer disassemble the vehicle before tender, to be "reasonably sure" that it had
not latent defects and was acceptable? Of course not.
Finally, the problem of the conformity of the retendered automobile
must be considered. The defective part was small and could be replaced
by a skilled mechanic. It was not replaced; rather, a new transmission
54
was substituted, possibly to save time or possibly because the dealer
did not have a replacement valve. The facts are not clear, but the result
is. The vehicle was "as good as new," according to the plaintiff and this
fact was uncontroverted by the defendant. The new replacement transmission was a factory built unit which was new and unused, hardly of
"unknown lineage" as the court indicated. Certainly tender of this repaired vehicle met the contractual obligations, and should not have been
invalidated as a "cure" which endeavors by substitution to tender a
chattel not within the agreement or contemplation of the parties.
Conclusion
The disclaimer warranty may be in its death throes, but it will probably remain with us for a time. The skillful practitioner often can avoid
its confinements by finding technical flaws or applying the unconscionability doctrine. But once past this hurdle, remedies must be considered;
and it is here that courts have shown little knowledge of the Code. It
would appear that few attorneys have relied upon Code Section 2-508,
2-106, 2-711, or 2-601, but this is the law. The Zabriskie case is unique
in that it contains an unusually complete examination of a disclaimer
problem in light of the Code. But, in spite of the reasoning, the decision
is dangerous if it signals any trend, because the law of perfect tender
53

Ibid.

54 A survey of a number of Cleveland's large Chevrolet dealers indicated that to

take 9.5
remove, tear down, rebuild, and replace a transmission of this type wouldSwitching
hours by the "book," but a good mechanic could better this by an hour.
transmissions as was done in Zabriskie takes about one hour.
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must be offset by the right of the seller to implement a reasonable cure.
The Code does not define "cure," and this may be a weak point. But
it

is questionable if anyone could apply a uniform definition
without
weighing each individual application. Here is the weakness
in the
Zabriskie decision. The court demanded too precise a cure;
and with
this same expectation the court stated by dicta that the buyer
was injured and not accorded "at least adequate remedies" under Code
Section
2-719. Some latitude must be allowed. This is the intent of
the Code,
and anything less will foster a new breed of Llewellyn's
contractdodgers 55 and destroy the sanctity of contractual relationship.
55 "If the contract-dodger cannot be bothered, if all he needs
is a rhinoceros hide
to thumb his nose at his creditor with impunity, more and more
contract-dodgers . . . and as between individual enterprises, the men will become
contract-dodger will drive the contract keeper into lowering his competition of the
own standards of
performance on pain of destruction." Llewellyn, What Price
Contract? 40 Yale
L. J. 704, n. 47 (1931).
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